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We are running a race with Time; 




The implementation of an imperial telegraph network over the course of the late 
nineteenth century caused a considerable amount of ink to be spilled, in praise, in fear 
and in confusion. By 1876, with the completion of the trans-Tasman cable between 
Australia and New Zealand, the British government could communicate with all of its 
major colonies by electric telegraph. As long as the lines remained intact (this was by 
no means a certainty), a message could be conveyed from London to Wellington, 
New Zealand, via the “thunderbolts of Jove”. 2 The rapid contraction of time and 
space that this entailed was much commented upon by contemporaries, who 
marvelled at the reduction in communication time between England and her antipodes 
from 3-4 months to a matter of hours. As the most distant colony in the empire, New 
Zealanders took up the new technology with alacrity: by 1904 New Zealand telegraph 
traffic ran at twice the rate of any other country in the world, and 5 times the rate in 
the United States.3 Although the bulk of these messages merely circuited throughout 
New Zealand and wider Australasia, it is quite clear that the telegraph was quickly 
identified as a useful tool of colonisation and nation building. 
Of course, the growth of the nineteenth century telegraph network captivated 
people worldwide. It came to symbolise the new power over nature represented by 
technological modernity. One commentator referred to the wires as “the nerves of the 
earth”4 and early biologists like Emil DuBois-Reymond (1818-1896) used the 
metaphor of telegraph systems to formulate his theory of the human nervous system.5 
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Electromagnetic telegraphy was closely related to more general advances in science 
and engineering associated with not only DuBois-Reymond and other early scientists 
like Alessandro Volta (1745-1827), Han Oersted (1777-1851), and George Simon 
Ohm (1787-1854), but the magical wires that transmitted messages across land and 
under the oceans had immediate implications for empire builders and strategists 
alike.6 Electric telegraphy was viewed by its various inventors and promoters as a 
‘tool of empire’, capable of uniting the empire at the very point at which it appeared 
to be losing cohesion. In retrospect, it is natural enough to suggest that that the 
telegraph, along with the steamship and railways, was one of the key catalysts behind 
the "imperialist euphoria [of] the last third of the nineteenth century".7  
 This is the claim of a number of recent (and not so recent) histories of 
technology in the British Empire, which all position the imperial telegraph network as 
a key agent of social, economic and cultural change across both individual colonies 
and the empire as a whole, suggesting that it was one important element in a complex 
matrix of communication, representation and material progress which acted to not 
only bind the empire in time, but in purpose and belief.8 While undoubtedly correct at 
the macro level (the success of the cable network can be determined quantitatively in 
terms of commerce and qualitatively at the level of culture and politics) none of these 
books has within its scope an extended examination of one area of empire, one colony 
which could be used as a case study to explicate the more complex and contradictory 
impacts of the telegraph. While all of them demonstrate an awareness of the issues 
surrounding the history of technology – and in particular the problem of technological 
determinism and resultant tendencies towards Whiggishness – their macro, imperial 
viewpoint tends to compromise their best intentions: the telegraph network expands, 
the steamships and railways are developed, and the empire is enhanced.  This essay 
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aims to complement the approach of these studies with a micro-study of the impact of 
the imperial telegraph’s arrival in New Zealand in 1876. As the most distant of all the 
British colonies (12,000 miles from London and 1200 miles from its nearest 
neighbour, Australia) New Zealand presents an intriguing study.  
 A second aim of this paper is to attempt an integration of the history of 
technology with what Robert Kubicek has recently termed “conventional”9 studies of 
empire. Although generally in praise of Marsden and Smith’s book, Kubicek quite 
correctly points out that if the history of technology is going to offer any really 
tangible new perspectives on imperial history, it needs to engage with the dominant 
models behind the expansion, development, and ultimate dissolution of that empire. 
Given the multiplication of theories about empire, from studies into the ‘British 
world’,10 the evergreen Gallagher and Robinson,11 their critique by Cain and 
Hopkins,12 a number of studies into relationships between centre and periphery13 
(reminiscent of the pioneering work by Edward Shills in America14), and Bernard 
Porter’s overt comparisons between Britain’s nineteenth century empire and 
America’s (technologically enabled, it should be noted) twenty-first century one, it 
seems a useful project.15  
 Rather than provide another critique of these theories - as has been done 
elsewhere16 - this paper proposes to remind readers of a solid model of empire that is 
infrequently cited, but of real use when analysing specific local examples of imperial 
expansion and consolidation. John Darwin’s notion of ‘imperial bridgeheads’, 
originally published in The English Historical Review in 199717, proposes that 
descriptions of British imperial expansion should acknowledge the “pluralism of 
British society”; the “diversity of British interests at work in the periphery”; and pay 
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“careful attention to the international constraints which shaped mid- as well as late 
Victorian expansion”: 
As Gallagher and Robinson rightly insisted, it was the 
energy of private British interests – settler, commercial, 
missionary amongst others – which supplied much of the 
dynamic behind Victorian expansion (617). 
 
Darwin’s imperial bridgeheads represent a mixture of “commercial, industrial, 
missionary, scientific, settler, naval and military interests” alongside “a variety of 
ideological and religious messages” which acted to determine the nature of British 
involvement at the political, cultural and discursive level (628). This writer would add 
colonial (and to a lesser extent imperial) government to the mix as well, but Darwin’s 
well-made point is that specific “bridgehead[s]” (629) were composed of different 
factors, “which in combination contributed to the either formal or informal nature of 
the relationship that evolved” (629). Darwin’s solution to the question of imperial 
expansion proposes a closely defined model of imperial expansion, predicated on 
these various bridgeheads functioning as the “hinge or interface between the 
metropole and a local periphery”.18 His model is nicely evocative of the chaos that 
attended British imperial advances worldwide, and works especially well for scholars 
attempting to understand the web of relationships that existed across the Australasian 
colonies during the nineteenth century. Darwin provides a complex, yet ultimately 
satisfying, picture of British territorial expansion that complements prior arguments 
and allows for the exploration of imperial history in a variety of different contexts. 
The extension of the imperial telegraph system to New Zealand during the 
1870s presents a good example of Darwin’s bridgehead in action. The project 
involved a great amount of commercial and private backing, but also involved both 
the New Zealand and imperial governments; it functioned in a cultural and perhaps 
also symbolic sense as an indicator of the colony’s growing technological maturity 
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and (importantly) a connection to the imperial centre; and it also involved differing 
degrees of scientific, settler, naval, and military interests. When the cable was finally 
laid in 1876, completing the thousands of miles of imperial cable connections snaking 
towards the metropole, the trans-Tasman cable symbolised the ultimate solidification 
of an imperial bridgehead, focussed on Australasia (rather than merely New Zealand) 
and predicated upon a broad front of commercial, strategic, social and cultural 
phenomena. 
 New Zealand scholars will not be surprised at the assertion of an extra-
regional bridgehead in relation to late-colonial New Zealand. Australian and New 
Zealand scholars have long noted that the country functioned as part of the Australian 
frontier for much of the nineteenth century19, and the topic has recently come in for 
detailed examination once again.20 Contrary to James Belich’s assertions that the 
country’s history is best understood in terms of an economically determined and 
culturally expressed ‘progress industry’21 aligned towards Britain for the vast 
majority of its history, it seems clear to many scholars that the initial colonisation - as 
well as the subsequent development of national identity – developed within a regional 
sphere composed of religious, commercial, agricultural, political, cultural and 
technological transfers across the Tasman.22 Clearly, both in terms of British 
expansion during the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of imperial 
feeling on the New Zealand periphery, Darwin’s notion of the bridgehead is 
extremely useful: British antipodean civilization was predicated upon an Australasian 
bridgehead. 23 
 The ironies of late nineteenth century New Zealand culture should also be 
noted here: as Stafford and Williams point out, New Zealand settler culture attempted 
to distinguish itself from Australia through reference to the “sublimity”24 of the 
 6 
country’s landscape and the archaic nature of Maori. The arrival of the 
electromagnetic cable into this cultural milieu provides a powerful symbol for the 
complex clash of imperialism, modernity and colonial nationalism with a 
marginalised indigenous culture. Although “born modern”, 25 colonial and late-
colonial New Zealand was as far from the industrial and technological centre of 
empire as it was possible to get, and the colonists were well aware of this. In very real 
terms, they found themselves on the “periphery of the periphery”,26 and looked 
forward to the arrival of the mail boats from Melbourne and later San Francisco with 
understandable passion.  
 As could be expected, the colony of New Zealand was in a transitional state in 
terms of industrial and technological development in 1876. With a European 
population of only slightly under 400,00027 and the global depression starting to 
impact on an already under-developed economy, the commercial viability of the 
colony looked in doubt. Economic decline had led to the election of Julius Vogel to 
power in 1873, on an election platform which promised massive capital expenditure 
on “the construction of roads, bridges and communications . . . and the introduction of 
settlers . . .”28 through loans raised on the London financial markets. Vogel himself 
was something of a colonial visionary, involved in a strong culture of utopianism and 
futurism29 which positioned New Zealand at the centre of a New World Order that 
would supposedly emerge once the Old World had undermined itself through 
industrialisation and war.30 He had a natural affinity for technological development. 
In addition to promoting the development of railways, water works, bridges, ports and 
roads in his 1873 election promise, he eventually brokered the deal for the trans-
Tasman cable and became Commissioner of Telegraphs.31 
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  New Zealand was not a technologically advanced Australasian colony, 
however. Unlike the centre, where canals, roads, gas lighting, and other industrial 
infrastructures had been developing since the eighteenth century, the colonists were 
mainly contending with the brute force and indifference of Nature. Homes were basic 
and generally self-built, civil infrastructures such as sewage and water rudimentary (if 
even present in some of the smaller centres, or on the gold-fields where towns had 
sprung up almost overnight) and travel both time-consuming and dangerous (in the 
period from 30th June 1875 - 30th June 1877 179 people lost their lives at river 
crossings alone).32 Life on the scattered colonial frontier, in timber milling camps, for 
instance, was even more arduous. Unlike Africa and parts of the United States and 
South America, New Zealand’s rivers were not navigable far inland, and tended to 
hinder rather than support river transport; milling camps, consequently, were often 
isolated affairs.  
Despite the difficulties, however, civil government and vested interests had 
developed far enough by the 1860s to ensure a continuing commitment to commercial 
and industrial development. Immigration and Public Works were positioned together 
by the colonial government,33 in explicit recognition of their interdependence; the 
financial success of the colony depended on continued industrialisation, 
manufacturing and the development of new markets; and industrialisation and 
manufacturing depended upon attracting skilled migrants. It is important to note that 
New Zealand governments during this period were concerned to find viable industries 
for the economy. This would change with the advent of refrigeration in the late 1880s, 
but in the context of Vogel’s 1870 proposal for a ₤10 million London loan, a global 
economic downturn, and the need to industrialize as quickly as possible, the problem 
was pressing.34 Reports on Colonial Industry presented to the colonial government in 
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1872 present the issue in stark terms: although gold and pastoralism were creating a 
degree of wealth in the South Island, diversification was called for, and the report 
identified the Sugar-beet, Fish Curing, Paper Manufacturing, Coal Mines, Sericulture 
(Mulberry Trees), Timber, Condensed Milk and Weaving industries as economic 
areas potential migrants should be made aware of.35 The same year, in investigating 
the need to press on with the creation of a colony-wide railway network, several 
provinces (notably Auckland and Wellington, where labour was particularly scarce) 
supported a proposal to encourage the immigration of Chinese labourers.36 Perhaps 
aware of the issues faced by the railways in Australia, where the adoption of different 
gauges in different states had led to serious problems,37 the New Zealand government 
had rejected bids by private companies to build the network,38 but then immediately 
had to grapple with the issue of labour. In this sense, the Australasian bridgehead was 
involved in a process of industrial experimentation, with New Zealand benefiting 
from Australian mistakes.  
Communication loomed large in these experiments: both within each colony, 
across the Tasman, and back to the imperial centre.39 The Australasian bridgehead – 
in all its commercial, governmental, religious and military guises - was in 
communication with the imperial centre on all matters of significance, but those 
communications took months.40 The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 reduced this 
to a matter of weeks but delays were still common and up to date news was 
impossible to get until the advent of the telegraph. Moreover, even after the Suez 
route opened, it was not easily navigable for the sailing ships which carried the vast 
bulk of Australasian cargo until the late 1890s. Steamships were slower to replace 
sailing ships on the London – Australasian route than elsewhere, simply because the 
length of the journey necessitated too much coal. It was only with the widespread 
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introduction of the compound or dual expansion steam engine (which used the steam 
twice over) and the geared steam turbine (later used to turn the ships propellers) that 
the journey became economic for anything other than high-value cargoes such as 
mail, which usually necessitated government subsidies.41 Given that relationships 
between New Zealand and Britain were particularly strained during the early 1870s 
because of the New Zealand Wars, and some New Zealand politicians were 
occasionally complaining of “unfair and unkind treatment”,42 efficient 
communications with the imperial government were a priority. 
From the start, communications between the Australasian bridgehead and the 
imperial centre were dependent upon government sponsorship. Although commercial 
interests were heavily involved in proposals for the implementation of telegraph lines, 
those proposals invariably included a degree of either government subsidy or 
assurance of monopoly control of the industry, or both.43 The reasons for the initial 
acquiescence to these demands lay at both ends of the system – at Home in London 
and on the periphery – although the Australasians appear to have been significantly 
more motivated to make advances. The imperial authorities, while encouraging 
developments for strategic reasons, were reticent about getting involved in major 
communications projects after a string of expensive failures with the London - Dover 
- Calais Cable, the Red Sea Cable and the Atlantic Cable.44 Here Darwin’s theory of 
bridgeheads is especially useful: the “diversity of British interests on the periphery” 
(commercial, governmental, and in Julius Vogel’s case, cultural and perhaps even 
personal) acted to solidify British territorial expansion through (colonial) government 
subsidised development based on overseas borrowing. 45 Although gentlemanly 
capitalists provided some finance, and a great deal of hectoring in the case of the 
telegraph, the colonial governments carried the financial and commercial risk for 
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developments in communications technologies such as railways and the telegraph: 46 
this was free trade on crutches. 
As Darwin suggests, however, the Australasian bridgehead functioned as a 
“hinge or interface between the metropole and a local periphery”.47 Colonial advances 
in communications infrastructures were undoubtedly met with pleasure at the centre, 
where issues of imperial defence were beginning to assume more importance. As the 
dominant global power, the British Empire had significant strategic issues to deal 
with, especially in terms of a series of colonial wars and continued tension on the 
Continent, so that its army and navy were stretched to their limits for much of the late 
nineteenth century. Technological advance was not always seen in a wholly positive 
light in this context. One percipient commentator noted in 1852 that 
[s]team navigation, railroads and the electrical telegraph . . 
. have powerfully increased her [Britain's] defensive 
resources; but at the same time they increase the means of 
attacking her, and prepare the way that leads to her 
shores.48 
 
The Indian Uprising of 1857 was only one manifestation of strategic problems related 
to the ratio of indigenous to British troops, supply, and mobilisation.49 Once the 
problems associated with submarine cables were surmounted in the 1860s,50 there 
was thus a great rush to complete an “All Red Route”51 around the world, which 
would touch only on British controlled territory (if at all; the aim was to create an 
exclusively undersea route) and allow prompt communication with all areas of the 
empire.  
The key to the successful development of an All Red Route was quite simple: 
each colony (or to use Darwin’s category, ‘bridgehead’) needed to develop an  
internal network of telegraph lines, which would then be strung together through 
submarine cables.52 Economic needs within each colony would determine the rate at 
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which internal telegraph networks were developed, but it was clear by the 1850s that 
this was a self-perpetuating process, with eager businessmen and colonial 
governments pressing forward. Because of the significant advantages held by British 
firms in both the underlying technology and (perhaps more importantly) the industrial 
and financial structures required to undertake such a massive project, and because 
Britain was the only empire with such far-flung colonies in need of strategic 
integration, Britain would dominate the laying and control of the world telegraphic 
network. And this is exactly what occurred. By the 1870s Britain led a powerful 
submarine cable industry, composed of companies specialising in cable 
manufacturing, laying and maintenance – and in the case of John Pender’s various 
interests under the umbrella of the Eastern Telegraph Company and its associates, all 
three. By 1880 Britain controlled 97,658 miles of the world’s submarine cables,53 and 
by 1900 over 135,000 miles, amounting to 72% of all the submarine cables 
worldwide.54 This was not achieved merely to facilitate the cultural integration of 
centre and periphery, but due to a complex matrix of commercial, governmental, 
strategic as well as cultural concerns voiced at both the centre and at the periphery.  
Strangely, perhaps, there was initially little motivation in New Zealand to 
connect to the All Red Route (which had reached Singapore by 1871), despite being 
inundated by offers from cable laying firms since the 1860s.55 Australia connected to 
the Singapore line in 1872, in combination with a 2000 mile line from Adelaide to 
Port Darwin, putting itself in close communication with London as long as the lines 
remained functional. But New Zealand also benefited from this connection. News that 
once took weeks to arrive from London now arrived in Melbourne within 12-24 
hours, and was immediately put on steamers for the trip across the Tasman to Bluff, 
where it was relayed across New Zealand’s own telegraph system through an 
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increasingly sophisticated press system.56 In 1874 an alteration to New Zealand’s 
Electric Telegraph Act, 1865, allowed for all telegrams originating in the colonies of 
New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland (Victoria had been included years 
before) to be transmitted across the Tasman by post for no additional charge.57 
Although the commercial impulse, in tandem with imperial and colonial assurances, 
got the lines as far as Australia, it took several years to make it the final 1200 miles 
across the Tasman. 
The reasons for this delay were several: submarine cables were no longer 
viewed as lucrative commercial enterprises, and it was felt (correctly as it turned out) 
that the trans-Tasman cable would simply not be economic and that the colony had 
too many other pressing technological concerns. Experience had also shown that up 
to 50% or more of telegraphic traffic worldwide was government or commerce-
related and the general public tended to avoid the services due to prohibitive costs. 
Cable laying firms such as Siemens and Eastern Telegraph regularly asked for terms 
that were unacceptable to the colonial government, such as line monopolies of up to 
50 years58 and ₤30,000 subsidies to ensure profitability. In addition to this, New 
Zealand was closely involved in negotiations to establish a mail service via San 
Francisco,59 which would provide faster service than via Australia and Suez and 
would itself be costly. Finally, New Zealand’s experience of maintaining a telegraph 
network indicated it was a problematic and costly business. 
 The first local telegraph line was developed in Christchurch in 1862, to run 
alongside the newly laid Christchurch – Lyttelton railway. Samuel Butler was so 
taken with the contrast between the rugged Canterbury Plains and the new 
technologies that he began writing philosophical tracts to the Christchurch Press60 
about machine theory, and later extended this into his chapter in Erewhon which 
 13 
explained why machines were banned from this dystopian land.61 Butler’s satire was 
an early indication of an antimodern tendency in colonial New Zealand culture, which 
soon evolved into full archaism, but his faith in the progress of the new technology 
was somewhat misplaced. The Christchurch line had been built by a private company 
contracted by the provincial government for the job, mainly for the purposes of 
enhanced communication between Christchurch and its port at Lyttelton, but it was 
by no means part of an integrated national strategy. The government received an offer 
from a Robert Macintyre of Dunedin in June 1863, on behalf of engineers from 
“Atlantic, Indian and other great telegraph undertakings” to “connect all the provinces 
in New Zealand together by telegraph wires” and then to connect New Zealand to 
Australia. But he was rebuffed by a cash-strapped and cynical House of 
Representatives which was being inundated by similar offers from newly minted 
telegraph companies offering their services all across the empire.62  
The following year Julius Vogel began to back the extension of the telegraph 
system, however, claiming that the extension of the system had the ability to “effect a 
universal revolution . . .” and unite the disparate provinces into one national body.63 A 
combination of commercial enterprise and interest from those very provinces had 
already started the process: the Telegraphic Engineer (based in Christchurch) reported 
that work on lines was underway across the South Island, in attempts to connect Bluff 
with Invercargill; Invercargill with Mataura; Mataura with Molyneux; Dunedin with 
Waitaki; Waitaki with Timaru; and finally Timaru with Christchurch.64 The extension 
of pastoralism in the South Island was undoubtedly fuelling this expenditure by the 
provincial governments, but it should be viewed as a localised and economically 
determined phenomenon. In the absence of railways, and with a small and highly 
dispersed population, the telegraph was believed to be a relatively cheap and effective 
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means of communication – especially between the various port towns and their 
hinterlands. Local communities thus placed ever-increasing amounts of pressure on 
their ministerial representatives to release funding.65 Telegraphic communication 
(even in the absence of a trans-Tasman cable) meant faster access to prices on the 
Australian and London markets and could be the difference between success and 
failure for small farming communities. Despite concerns within central government 
that telegraphs were “a thing to be avoided in the present financial state of the 
colony”,66 and that “the expense would be enormously greater than in England where 
the poles were placed along the railroad”67 rather than through difficult terrain, there 
appears to have been considerable interest within provincial governments. 
 Eric Pawson and Neil C. Quigley have gone further than this, and suggested 
that New Zealand’s telegraph system greatly enhanced communication between the 
provinces and was implicated in the centralisation of government authority, as Vogel 
had envisaged.68 Certainly, when the New Zealand government shifted their 
proceedings from Auckland to Wellington in 1865, the telegraph system was 
immediately enhanced. Although the telegraph office remained in Christchurch, the 
government made it clear to the chief engineer, Alfred Sheath, that it was “anxious”69 
to proceed with a Cook Strait cable and ordered soundings for this purpose. 
Unfortunately for Sheath his subsequent survey was faulty, the landing point for the 
cable was ill-chosen, and New Zealanders had to put up "with repeated and often 
lengthy periods when, for one reason or another, it failed to work".70 Nevertheless, 
the relocation of the New Zealand government clearly impacted upon the 
development of the colony’s telegraph network to a far greater degree than either 
private enterprise or imperial strategy.71 The Cook Strait cable was finally landed 
(after a failed attempt when an accident aboard the cable ship broke the cable) in 
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1866 – the same year as the Atlantic Cable. By the late 1860s the colonial 
government was beginning the process of buying the country’s telegraph network off 
the provinces and extending the network wherever possible, under the direction of the 
Postmaster General who began issuing regulations to govern the use of the telegraph 
system.72 
 A combination of pressure from local communities, central government and 
commercial forces extended the system exponentially over the next decade, with 
unfortunate results. In 1868 there were 1,183 miles of  line with 98,000 messages 
transmitted;73 in 1871 there were 2107 miles of line and 312, 874 messages;74 1874 
2,530 miles of line and 752, 899 messages;75 and 1875 2986 miles of line and 
917,128 messages.76 By the early 1870s most lines began to double the wire carried 
on them, thus increasing the number of messages that could be sent. Until the 1890s 
the vast majority of the messages were governmental, but the system was unreliable 
and prohibitively expensive for most people, with claims that “[i]t really did not carry 
out the function it was intended to carry out when established, and the expense . . . 
was not in any degree warranted by [its] trifling success . . .”.77 The Telegraph 
Department reported frequent complaints throughout 1867 and Sheath was forced to 
table a 6 page report detailing poor timber quality in the poles used; high cost of 
labor; absence of good roads; difficulty conveying tools and materials; the return of 
previously cleared bush; and on several occasions wilful damage of insulators by 
people opposed to the telegraph system.78 Coupled with the problems associated with 
the Cook Strait cable this did not bode well for Sheath, and he was replaced by 
Charles Lemon as general manager the following year. Lemon immediately 
undertook a refit of all the faulty South Island lines.79 
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Despite these problems the telegraph system became more than a merely 
utilitarian tool. It became a symbol of the colony’s maturation and development and a 
marker of New Zealanders’ desire for technological development independent of the 
other Australasian colonies: technological advance was quickly connected to cultural 
advance. In large part any feelings of pride were articulated within a broader 
discourse of imperial loyalty, but in fundamental terms this period in New Zealand 
history witnessed the first growth of a colonial identity distinct from, and sometimes 
even in opposition to, both imperial and Australasian identity.80  Ironically, then, the 
growth of colonial nationalism went hand in hand with the extension of the electric 
telegraph system: the settlers sought autochthony wherever they could in order to 
build a bulwark against the feelings of isolation they felt (exacerbated by the wars). 
That could be found in either archaism or the futurism implicit in technological 
advance. By the time Julius Vogel was appointed as Telegraph Commissioner in 1869 
it was abundantly clear that the network was viewed as something of considerable 
importance to the colony as a whole. He refused a request in the House for telegraph 
offices to be closed on Sundays,81 on the grounds that “the disturbed state of the 
country” 82 required important telegrams to be despatched without a moment’s delay. 
In 1870 Vogel began to move drafts of the Immigration and Public Works 
Act, and involve himself with the issue of “telegraphic communication with 
Europe”.83 As Commissioner for Telegraphs he felt that the colonies should act 
jointly and not allow any future imperial or world network to fall into commercial 
hands, voicing a clear preference for an imperial network that would be quite distinct 
from any wider world network that might compromise imperial security in times of 
war as well as peace. 84 Vogel was eventually charged with the important task, in this 
context at least, of securing a reasonable contract for the laying of the trans-Tasman 
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cable and the completion of an imperial network that spanned the world. Impetus did 
not come from the imperial government, who were quite content with having 
established communication with Australasia generally. Indeed, Vogel faced 
considerable difficulty convincing the British to ignore their own economic 
difficulties and finance his public works and communications plans, despite an 
obviously strong desire throughout the empire for the development of ‘better 
Britains’. The general feeling was summed up well by a contributor to Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine in 1862: 
In these outlying unpeopled regions of the globe the British 
race increases with a rapidity beyond the reach of the 
Continental nations; and every year is bringing closer the 
scattered sections of our numerous and powerful race, 
annihilating distances by the ever-increasing triumphs of 
the railway, telegraph and steam navigation. New Zealand, 
Australia, the Cape - in fact all our colonies, by the force of 
blood and the necessity of position, will ere long become 
important maritime Powers.85 
  
 
New Zealand’s industrialization, represented in this case by the growing telegraph 
system, was therefore symbolic of not only colonial nationalist, but imperial 
sentiment. Politicians on the periphery engaged in what could be termed ‘imperial 
boosterism’ at the same time as they furthered their colony’s own interests. Rather 
than (necessarily) being an obsequious process of recolonisation as Belich argues,86 it 
was often a potentially arrogant assertion of futurism, wherein the colonies would 
strengthen the centre against both external enemies and the internal pressures exerted 
by industrial modernity. Miles Fairburn and Lyman Tower Sargent have pointed out 
the arcadian component to this sequence of events,87 but it is equally valid to posit a 
futurist, technological component as expressed by Vogel and others. In a burst of 
technological hubris, for instance, one MP suggested in 1876 that the telegraph be 
used for voting, in an early manifestation of the desire for New Zealand to become a 
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‘social laboratory’.88 As Stafford and Williams suggest,  “[t]he contradiction at the 
heart of Maoriland is that its archaism cohabits with and compensates for the colony’s 
sense of its own modernity”.89 
 Vogel had been pressing for a trans-Tasman cable since the All Red Route 
reached Bombay in 1870, but commercial conditions were not right and other New 
Zealand politicians were wary of further expenditure on telegraphs.90 Worse still, 
while Vogel was in London in 1871, it became clear that there was "no prospect at all 
of the British government supporting the cable".91 Over the next 5 years, Vogel 
approached companies and tried to broker a deal for a trans-Tasman cable, amidst 
complaints in parliament back in New Zealand regarding his mounting costs and the 
point of having a Premier who was often absent from the country for long periods. To 
Vogel the point was clear: he needed to raise a substantial loan and connect New 
Zealand into the imperial telegraph network, for the benefit of both the colony and the 
empire.  The subject was discussed at length at the inter-colonial conference in 
Sydney during 1873, where it was decided that telegraphic communication between 
the various colonies of the empire was of the utmost importance to defence and 
internal relations between colonies. Vogel’s vision for the empire dovetailed with a 
resurgence in calls for imperial federation, which were gathering pace over the later 
third of the nineteenth century. The telegraph system, and technological advance 
generally, undoubtedly informed the debate. As Duncan Bell notes, "[t]he second half 
of the nineteenth century was infused by a commanding belief in the power of science 
and technology to solve the manifold problems of society",92 and ideas about imperial 
federation reflected a “fundamental shift in the manner in which people viewed the 
world and their relationship to it".93  
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 Vogel eventually agreed to a proposal by a Tasmanian politician by the name 
of Audley Coote, on behalf of the British firm Siemens Brothers, to lay cables 
between New Zealand, New South Wales, Queensland and Singapore. The plan was 
bold, in that rather than merely linking New Zealand to Australia, it would create a 
completely new second line back to Britain, securing more reliable communications 
(the Australia – Java line was perpetually in need of repair due to the tropical heat and 
most news still arrived by steamer) and dividing the cost between all the Australasian 
colonies. The idea was ratified by the New Zealand parliament but the NSW 
parliament was slow to follow suit. After two years of negotiations the deal fell 
through and the New Zealanders had to look elsewhere, eventually accepting a 
proposal by John Pender’s Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph 
Company, which already ran the Singapore cable and was an associate of the 
dominant international line company.94 The final proposal called for a £7500 
government subsidy per year for 10 years for the trans-Tasman cable for a cost of £6 / 
15/- for a cable from New Zealand to London. The resultant cable would only be 
economic to this extent because of an existing £20,000 subsidy from New Zealand 
and the Australian colonies for the London – Darwin section of the line. Companies 
were simply not willing to shoulder all of the commercial risk entailed in these 
projects.95 This contract was signed on 24 June 1875, with an assurance that the line 
would be operational no later than 30 April the following year.96  
 Contrary to the debacles associated with the development of the internal 
network, the project ran smoothly, over-seen by the London engineering firm Clark, 
Forde & Co.97 A 1200 mile cable was laid in four pieces by the specialist cable-laying 
ships the Hibernia and the Edinburgh, making landfall on February 17.98 The name 
“Cable Bay” replaced “Schroeder’s Mistake” (the original name of the bay, at the top 
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of the South Island) a week later.99 Despite being overshadowed by the abolition of 
the provinces the same year and (ironically) Julius Vogel’s return from London to a 
state banquet in Wellington,100 the trans-Tasman cable received considerable 
newspaper space, both in the lead up to the connection and during the rather extensive 
celebrations in Nelson, which included a picnic organised by the officers of the 
Hibernia, a Masonic Lodge banquet, a special sermon at the Anglican Cathedral, and 
a rail journey to the Waimea Steeplechase.101 In a passage which neatly captures the 
sense of futurism which (ironically) cohabited with archaism in New Zealand, The 
North Otago Times noted that: 
Wonderful as the modern triumphs of Science have been, 
most prominent among them all is the chaining of the 
lightning to the car of the world’s progress, converting, 
almost without metaphor it may be said, the very 
thunderbolts of Jove into pens of ready writers.102 
  
 Despite the public hyperbole, however, the exorbitant cost of telegrams from 
New Zealand to Britain raises an obvious point: most telegrams only went as far as 
Australia, and even then the bulk of them were of a governmental or commercial 
nature. On the Monday following the initial connection only 54 inward cables were 
received and 93 sent, and the cable was never a commercial success. Over the course 
of the first year 3467 cables were sent from Australia to New Zealand through the 
cable and 3268 from New Zealand to Australia. The same year there was a break in 
all three of the Cook Strait cables,103 and telegraphic communication was proving so 
intermittent that negotiations began for a second cable to ensure “uninterrupted 
communication with the rest of the world”.104 With the cost of line maintenance 
increasing yearly, and absolutely no support from the British government or 
commercial interests, nothing further was achieved until the laying of the Pacific 
Cable in 1902. Uptake of the technology by the general public was slow due to the 
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high cost of telegrams and the increasing efficiency of the mail services. Efficiency 
did increase, to the point where 23 telegrams were sent for every 100 letters,105 and 
New Zealanders became the highest users of telegraphic services anywhere in the 
world per capita,106 but most of the users remained either governmental or 
commercial and maintenance costs were an ongoing issue. 
Major gains were made because of the telegraph, however, especially in 
relation to the development of New Zealand culture and identity. Two rather telling 
breakthroughs were the introduction of New Zealand Standard Time in 1868107 and 
the accurate calculation of longitude in 1876.108 In this sense, as Quigley and Pawson 
suggest, the telegraph system was involved in not only the "shrinking and 
homogenising"109 of colonial New Zealand culture, but in the ongoing mapping of the 
country identified as so important by Giselle Byrnes.110 Direct connection to Britain 
at the governmental level undoubtedly assisted the country to assert its imperial 
credentials when opportunities arose as well (the most famous perhaps being Premier 
Seddon’s promise of troops for the South African War before war had even been 
declared), but the development of the press system was probably the most significant 
feature. 111 As Simon Potter points out, New Zealand and Australia were tied into an 
imperial system of news distribution almost solely because the ownership of the 
lines.112 The “Eastern and Eastern Extension Telegraph Company enjoyed a 
monopoly over Australian traffic”,113 and New Zealand remained almost totally 
dependent upon an Australasian model of news distribution for the rest of the 
nineteenth century.114 In this sense, the Australasian bridgehead was perpetuated by 
the imperial cable network not only at a commercial, but a cultural level.  
The extension of the imperial cable network to nineteenth century New 
Zealand was by no means a great triumph of engineering, therefore, but it was 
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nevertheless a triumph for the empire. The fact that the system was extended across 
the Tasman from Australia despite a lack of commercial merit, a lack of public 
interest, and for many years outright hostility from both the imperial and colonial 
governments, speaks volumes to the merely discursive, or perhaps imaginative, power 
exerted by the idea of empire – and the interpenetration of this conceit with both 
technological modernity and utopianism. The project is reflective of Miles Taylor’s 
identification of an "imperialist euphoria”115 which took hold during the last third of 
the nineteenth century, and interestingly suggests that this euphoria may have been 
enough in itself (especially when attached to the mind of a man like Julius Vogel) to 
force progress against commercial logic. Once established in New Zealand, for 
reasons nationalist as well as imperial, the telegraph system came to symbolise the 
ultimate connection between the past and present, in a mode of colonial nationalism 
which claimed autochthony through both archaism and technological modernity.  
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